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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Ann B. Hopkins has sued Price Waterhouse 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that Price Waterhouse 
intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of sex by 
not admitting her as a partner of the firm. She essentially 
challenges two decisions: the first by the members of the 
Policy Board of Price Waterhouse to plac e her candidacy on 
"hold" in March 1983, and the second by the partners in the 
Price Waterhouse Office of Government Services ("OGS"), the 
office in which plaintiff was employed, not to propose her for 
the next admissions cycle, which began in August 1983.Ll_/ 
At trial, plaintiff satisfied her burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination, and 
Price Waterhouse articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason as to each of the decisions, and thus has carried its 
burden of production under the analysis set forth in Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
l/ Plaintiff resigned her employment with Price Waterhouse in 
January 1984. Although she alleged in her Complaint that Price 
Waterhouse subjected her to retaliation and constructive 
discharge, and continued to retaliate against her after her 
"constructive discharge," she abandoned these charges at 
trial. Thus, the only remedy to which plaintiff might be 
entitled should she prevail on the merits would be backpay 
limited to the period ending with the date of her resignation. ~ 
Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 
n.8 (5th Cir. 1980); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 
F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). 
252-56 (1981) . The issue before the Court therefore is whether 
plaintiff has demonstrated that the reasons articulated by 
Price Waterhouse were not the true reasons underlying these 
decisions and thus has satisfied her ultimate burden of 
persuading the Court that she has been the victim of 
intentional discrimination on the basis of sex. Id. at 256. 
As is explained in full below, plaintiff simply has not met 
this burden. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That The Reasons Articulated 
By Price Waterhouse For The "Hold" Decision Were 
Pretextual. 
The decision by the Policy Board to place plaintiff's 
candidacy on hold was based on concerns expressed by Price 
Waterhouse partners concerning her interpersonal skills; that 
is, her relations and manner of dealing with others within the 
firm. These concerns were evident upon review of the long and 
short form commentary, and Admissions Committee memoranda 
concerning interviews with individual partners. Thus, the 
Admissions Committee recommended, and the Policy Board 
concluded, that plaintiff's candidacy should be held at least a 
year in order to see if plaintiff could improve her 
interpersonal skills. Thus, Price Waterhouse has articulated a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the Policy Board's 
1983 "hold" decision through the introduction of the long and 
short forms, office visit memoranda, Admissions Committee 
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recommendation, notes of the Policy Board discussion and the 
testimony of Joseph Connor, Donald Ziegler, and Roger 
Marcellin, and has carried its burden of production. Plaintiff 
has failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the 
articulated reasons are pretextual, and accordingly has failed 
to satisfy her ultimate burden of persuading the Court that she 
was the victim of intentional discrimination on the basis of 
sex. Price Waterhouse therefore is entitled to judgment in its 
favor concerning this decision. 
A. Price Waterhouse Examines The Interpersonal Skills Of 
Every Candidate For Admission. 
It is undisputed that the category of interpersonal 
skills is examined routinely both before and during the 
admissions process with respect to all candidates, male and 
female. Over the course of their careers at Price Waterhouse, 
employees are periodically evaluated concerning such 
characteristics as poise, tact, personality, acceptance by 
others, and interpersonal skills with respect to associates. 
(Defendant's Exhs. 6 & 25) After candidates are proposed, the 
firm requests partners who have had substantial contact with 
them to rate them on acceptance by partners, staff and clients, 
tolerance, maturity and poise, sensitivity and tact, 
adaptability and sense pf humor on the long-form evaluation. 
(Defendant's Exh. 21) Partners with less contact evaluate the 
candidates' poise, authority and maturity, and congeniality on 
the short-form evaluation. (Defendant's Exh. 22) 
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Such considerations have been recognized as valid 
criteria in evaluating candidates for supervisory positions. 
See Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Department, 717 F.2d 263 / 
(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1687 (1984); Burrus 
v. United Telephone Co., 683 F . 2d 339 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446 
(9th Cir. 1976); Nance v. Union Carbide Co., 540 F.2d 718 (4th 
Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 952 
(1977); Faulkenheiner v. Legal Aid Society, 471 F . . Supp. 429 
(M.D. La. 1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1980). 
Examination of such factors is especially critical in the 
evaluation of partnership candidates because of the degree of 
professional autonomy accorded partners. 
In addition, the partners often provide written 
commentary on candidates' interpersonal skills in response to 
the open-ended questions that are set forth at the end of the 
long and short forms. Virtually every candidate for admission 
from 1982 through 1984 received some written commentary 
concerning his or her interpersonal skills. (Defendant's 
Exh. 68) Furthermore, the partners who commented upon 
plaintiff's interpersonal skills routinely commented about the 
interpersonal skills of male candidates, sometimes using the 
same adjectives as those found in plaintiff's long- and 
short-form comments. (Defendant's Exh. 74) 
The Admissions Committee often cites such commentary 
in the memoranda that accompany its ''hold" and "no" 
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recommendations to the Policy Board. The record shows that 
Admissions Committee references to interpersonal skills in this 
context began well before plaintiff's candidacy, continued 
through the year of her candidacy with respect to other 
candidates, and appeared in the next year's recommendations as 
well. (Defendant's Exh. 64) Thus, the evidence shows that 
interpersonal skills are regularly and routinely examined by 
the firm with respect to all candidates. 
B. The Commentary Concerning Plaintiff's Interpersonal 
Skills Had A Factual Basis. 
The record before the Court reveals that there is no 
serious dispute between the parties as to the factual basis for 
the commentary concerning plaintiff's interpersonal skills. 
Plaintiff's own testimony establishes that she was aware of her 
difficulties in dealing with Price Waterhouse partners and 
staff, and this testimony is corroborated by the business 
records and other testimony before the Court. 
1. Plaintiff's Own Testimony Corroborates The 
Factual Basis For Commentary Concerning Her 
Interpersonal Skills. 
Although plaintiff now apparently argues that 
there was no factual basis for the concerns expressed about her 
interpersonal skills, (Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact 
("Plaintiff's Findings") 26-37), she cannot seriously dispute 
that she had difficulties in her relations with Price 
Waterhouse partners and staff in light of her testimony before 
s 
this Court. She denied in her early testimony that anyone had 
spoken to her about difficulties in this area, (R. 21 & 36) , 
but the balance of her testimony, both upon direct and 
cross-examination, squarely contradicts this assertion. Thus, 
not only does her testimony confirm her interpersonal skills 
deficiencies, but it also raises serious questions as to her 
credibility. 
Plaintiff directly contradicted herself by 
admitting eventually that three OGS partners spoke . to her about 
improving her interpersonal skills, (R. 122), and that she 
received notice of such problems in performance evaluations and 
counseling sessions. (R. 52) Her testimony further 
corroborates that she had problems in her dealings with both 
partners and staff. As to her dealings with partners, plaintiff 
stated that she was difficult to work with and had acted like a 
"bitch" on the FMS project towards OGS partner Benton Warder. 
( R. 107-08; Deposition of Ann Hopkins (Vol. I) ( "Hopkins Dep. ") 
at 74-75) In addition, she described her disagreements with 
Norman Statland, the National Director of Electronic Data 
Processing, as strong and violent. ( R. 85) 
As to her relations with Price Waterhouse staff, 
plaintiff admitted to difficulties with Thomas Colberg and the 
staff in St. Louis. (R. 19, 67 & 125) She also stated that 
many of the staff difficulties described by partners in the 
long and short forms had been conveyed to these partners either 
directly or indirectly by OGS and St. Louis staff members. (R. 
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126 & 131-32) Such comments are hardly surprising in light of 
plaintiff's own description of the working conditions on her 
projects. She painted a picture of squabbles, shouting, 
disagreements, short tempers and tension on every project in 
which she was involved at Price Wate rhouse. (R . 21 & 34) 
Thus, plaintiff's testimony fully corroborates her difficulties 
in interpersonal dealings with Price Waterhouse partners and 
staff. 
2 . Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are 
Corroborated By Performance Evaluations And 
Counseling Session Notes. 
Plaintiff's difficulties in the area of 
interpersonal skills are documented in her performance 
evaluations and counseling session notes that are before the 
Court. As early as 1980, plaintiff's need to improve her 
interpersonal skills was noted in a performance evaluation. 
(Defendant's Exh. 7) Such references appeared regularly 
through the fall of 1982. (Defendant's Exhs. 13, 14, 15, 24, 
25 & 26) In addition, partners' notes of counseling sessions 
record discussions with plaintiff concerning difficulties in 
interpersonal skills, as well as her agreement that some people 
believed that she was hard to work with, that she was overly 
assertive, that she needed to be more tolerant and p atient, and 
that dealing effectively and motivationally with staff was her 
primary weakness . (Defendant's Exhs. 11, 17 & 25) 
7 
Faced with this documentary evidence, plaintiff 
does not dispute that she was counseled concerning her 
relations and dealings with others. Instead, she claims that 
she was not told that these problems would adversely affect her 
partnership chances. (Plaintiff's Findings 27-30) Not only 
does this assert i on conflict with the documentary evidence, it 
also corroborates plaintiff's difficulties in the area of 
interpersonal skills. 
Fredric Laughlin made explicit reference to the 
effect of this deficiency on her chances for admission in h is 
1981 counseling notes as follows: "While this is a very 
difficult area in which to measure progress and ultimate 
success, it is no less important for purposes of evaluation by 
the partners for admission." (Defendant's Exh. 11) The effect 
of plaintiff's interpersonal skills difficulties upon her 
chances for admission were also noted in a performance 
evaluation by Timothy Coffey: "I suspect this is the one area 
where Ann needs to show improvement to become a partner." 
(Defendant's Exh. 25) Furthermore, plaintiff wrote "agreed" 
and her initials beside Coffey's comment, in addition to 
signing the evaluation. (Id. ) 
Plaintiff's assertion that no one ever told her 
that these difficulties could affect her admission, in addition 
to being inaccurate, itself corroborates her problems in this 
area. Inherent in this assertion is the suggestion that 
plaintiff would have worked harder at interpersonal skills if 
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she had known that it was important to her chances of 
admission. By negative implication, then, plaintiff would have 
only been interested in improving her relations with others had 
she known that it would affect her chances for admission. 
Plaintiff's attitude strongly suggests that she did not 
recognize the importance of interpersonal skills in performing 
her duties as a Senior Manager. 
3. Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are 
Corroborated By The Number Of Negative Comments. 
As noted above, over half of the comments 
concerning plaintiff's candidacy discussed deficiencies in the 
area of interpersonal skills both in her dealings with partners 
and staff. The sheer number of such comments and the fact that 
they came from partners in Price Waterhouse offices throughout 
the country serve to corroborate plaintiff's deficiencies. 
Plaintiff did not controvert the accuracy of their statements. 
Indeed, she affirmatively supported the basis for these 
comments by testifying that several partners received their 
information concerning her relations with staff from the staff 
itself. (R. 126 & 131-32) 
Plaintiff chooses instead to challenge the 
limited contact that she had with some of these partners, which 
they fully disclosed in their written comments. (Plaintiff's 
Findings 51-52) The fact that she does not remember even 
meeting some of these partners weakens rather than strengthens 
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her case by pointing out her deficiencies in the area of 
interpersonal skills. 
4. Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are 
Corroborated By Her Supporters. 
Plaintiff's deficiencies in the area of 
interpersonal skills are further corroborated by her 
supporters' written commentary on the long and short forms and 
the discussions documented in the Admissions Committee office 
visit memoranda. (Defendant's Exhs. 27, 30 & 31) These 
materials demonstrate that plaintiff's supporters recognized 
her weaknesses in this area, but balanced them differently than 
her detractors did in commenting in favor of her admission. 
Furthermore, even those who did not comment upon her 
interpersonal skills on the long and short forms confirmed such 
deficiencies during the Admissions Committee's office visit to 
0GS, and expressed doubts as to plaintiff's ability to change 
in this respect. (Defendant's Exh. 30) Plaintiff has chosen 
to characterize comments from supporters recognizing her 
positive and negative characteristics as "damning with faint 
praise," but the record shows that the descriptions of her 
strengths cannot accurately be labeled "faint praise. 11 
(Defendant's Exhs. 27, 30 & 31) 
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5. Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are 
Corroborated By The Testimony Of The Price 
Waterhouse Witnesses. 
This conclusive documentary evidence concerning 
plaintiff's interpersonal skills, especially in the area of 
staff relations, is further bolstered by the testimony of 
Thomas Beyer, Timothy Coffey, Barrett Boehm, and Donald 
Epelbaum. These four witnesses gave uncontroverted examples of 
staff members in OGS and in the St. Louis office who described 
their difficulties in working with plaintiff, and expressed the 
sentiment that they did not want to work with plaintiff again. 
(R. 192-97, 218, 344-45, 350, 353, 364-65, 386-87 & 390-91) In 
addition, Boehm described plaintiff's dealings with him on the 
FmHA proposal as direct, abrupt, insensitive and demeaning. 
(R. 363) 
Plaintiff did not dispute at trial that the staff 
members had made these statements . Indeed, she confirmed 
difficulties with them, and admitted that they had conveyed 
these difficulties to the partners. Having failed to question 
these statements at trial, she now criticizes the fact that 
Price Waterhouse did not present the testimony of staff members 
other than Boehm at trial. (Plaintiff's Findings 31 & 35) The 
fact that Price Waterhouse chose not to lengthen the trial by 
duplicating undisputed testimony is hardly sufficient grounds 
upon which to satisfy her burden of establishing pretext. 
Plaintiff had ample opportunity to call these individuals as 
adverse witnesses, had she wished to cross-examine them. 
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Furthermore, Epelbaum testified credibly in 
detail as to his own dealings with plaintiff that influenced 
his input during the 1983 admissions cycle. He found plaintiff 
very talented and bright, and outstanding in oral and written 
communications, but had some difficulties with her. She was 
combative and argumentative, used harsh terms, and barged into 
his office without knocking. He testified that she had called 
some of his advice concerning interpersonal skills "stupid." 
(R. 376, 377-78 & 380) 
Plaintiff denied calling his advice stupid and 
explained that she rarely uses the term "stupid," and would 
more likely use a term such as "inappropriate." (R. 705) Such 
testimony is hardly credible, coming from an individual who 
testified that she often criticized the work product of others 
as II all fucked up." (R. 714; Hopkins Dep. at 94) Furthermore, 
plaintiff's testimony did not address whether she criticized 
his advice using some other term. Plaintiff's attempt to 
somehow discredit Epelbaum's testimony by placing the advice a 
year later in time, after the OGS decision not to repropose 
her, should be discredited similarly. (R. 715) 
6. Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are 
Corroborated By The Testimony Of Her Rebuttal 
Witnesses. 
Plaintiff produced three witnesses to "rebut" the 
overwhelming evidence that she had difficulties in her 
relations with staff. The first such witness, Karen Nold, 
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testified that she would work with plaintiff again, but 
admitted that plaintiff had a controversial management style, 
and presented things as she saw them, sometimes not thinking 
about the response of the other person. (R. 420, 422 & 423) 
Thus, Nold's testimony as to her personal reaction to plaintiff 
hardly can be said to rebut the overwhelming evidence that 
others had difficulties in their dealings with her. 
The other two "rebuttal" witnesses, Sandra Kinsey 
and Harry Barschdorf, worked with plaintiff on the . REMS project 
after the partners commented upon plaintiff's 1983 candidacy, 
and their testimony does not purport to address her dealings 
before that time. (R. 425, 437) Nevertheless, Kinsey 
corroborated the evidence as to plaintiff's interpersonal 
skills when she agreed that it was her view that working on a 
routine basis with plaintiff required a lot of "diplomacy, 
patience and guts." ( R. 434) 
7. The Testimony Of The State Department Officials 
Is Irrelevant To The Issue Before This Court. 
As part of her case in chief, plaintiff presented 
the testimony of United States State Department officials who 
had been her clients, and asserts that their views are relevant 
to the issue of pretext. (Plaintiff's Finding 34) Their 
relationships with plaintiff were never at issue in the 
admissions process, and thus their testimony is irrelevant to 
this proceeding. Indeed, the fact that plaintiff was able to 
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maintain good relations with her clients simply suggests that 
she exercised interpersonal skills on a selective basis. 
C. The Commentary Concerning Plaintiff's Interpersonal 
Skills Was Not Based On Her Sex. 
The record before the Court is devoid of any direct 
evidence, testimonial or documentary, of sex discrimination on 
the part of the partners who commented negatively on her 
candidacy. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that these 
individuals were sex-neutral in their comments and in their 
recommendations. Plaintiff therefore relies on the speculative 
testimony of her expert witness, Dr. Fiske, in order to attempt 
to satisfy her burden of establishing pretext. 
1 . Plaintiff Has Presented No Direct Evidence Of Sex 
Discrimination On The Part Of Any Of Those Who 
Commented Negatively Upon Her Candidacy. 
Plaintiff has introduced no direct evidence to 
attempt to show that any of the partners who commented 
negatively did so because of her sex. Indeed, plaintiff would 
be hard-pressed to £ind support in the record for her 
proposition that the negative comments were based on her sex. 
These partners comment routinely, both positively and 
negatively, concerning the interpersonal skills of male 
candidates in the admissions process, and on occasion have made 
identical negative comments about plaintiff and a male 
candidate. (Defendant's Exh. 74) Furthermore, many of these 
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partners have supported other female candidates. 
Exh. 63) 
(Defendant's 
2 . Plaintiff's Argument That These Comments Were The 
Result Of Sexual Stereotyping Is Pure Speculation. 
Having failed to establish any direct evidence of 
sex discrimination on the part of the commentors, plaintiff has 
turned to an expert witness to provide a "conceptual framework" 
for plaintiff's theory that she would have not received these 
negative comments had she been a man. (Plaintiff's Findings 
57-62) The testimony of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Fiske, cannot 
suffice to advance this theory because her testimony had no 
factual basis and was essentially circular. In order to reach 
the conclusion that the Price Waterhouse partners would not 
have viewed plaintiff as negatively as they did had she been a 
man, Dr . Fiske assumed, without any analysis of the partners 
themselves or any in-depth study of the admissions process, 
that each of them conformed to her male stereotype that has 
different expections regarding the behavior of men and women. 
(R. 547-48) 
Dr. Fiske testified that the overall stereotype 
of a woman is to be socially concerned and understanding and 
that the stereotype of a man is to be competitive, ambitious, 
independent and active. (R. 547) Based on a limited review of 
the Admissions Committee materials concerning plaintiff, and a 
small percentage of the other admissions materials that were 
available to her, (R. 596), Dr. Fiske concluded that the 
15 
partners had reacted negatively to plaintiff because she 
behaved in a manner incongruent with their expectations. (R. 
559 & 564) Such a characterization of the Price Waterhouse 
partners is itself a stereotype, which Dr. Fiske defined as "a 
set of beliefs that are presumed to be true about a person on 
the basis of categorizing them within any given social 
category." (R. 535-36) 
Dr. Fiske admittedly presumed certain 
characteristics to be true about the Price Waterhouse partners 
without any factual inquiry, such as a comparison of their 
comments about male candidates with their comments about 
plaintiff. (R. 593-95) The record before the Court shows that 
Price Waterhouse partners, including those who commented 
concerning plaintiff, react negatively to male candidates who 
are abrasive, overbearing and tough on staff. Furthermore, 
they comment positively upon male candidates who are personable 
and sensitive to others, who exhibit social grace, and who have 
good relations with their staff. (Defendant's Exh. 68) 
In support of her conclusion, Dr. Fiske cited 
several indicators of stereotyping, including categorical 
thinking, attention to stereotypic dimensions such as social 
skills, selective perception, and intensely negative 
evaluations. (R. 557-60) Her only example of categorical 
thinking was on the part of Beyer, plaintiff's strongest 
supporter. (R. 554) The record shows that the balance of 
these conditions exist with respect to male and female 
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candidates. First, all candidates receive comments concerning 
interpersonal skills, the so-called stereotypic dimension. 
Second, the Admissions Committee materials display some 
divergence of opinion concerning the interpersonal skills of 
almost every candidate. Third, extreme and intense comments, 
both positive and negative, are the regular fodder of the 
admissions process. (Defendant's Exh. 68) 
In short, the thrust of Dr. Fiske's testimony is 
that subjecting plaintiff to the same process by which male 
candidates, and those female candidates who conform to 
Dr. Fiske's stereotype of what a Price Waterhouse partner 
expects of a woman, are evaluated was somehow unfair. This 
hardly suffices to satisfy plaintiff's burden of establishing 
that she was the victim of intentional sex discrimination. The 
testimony of Dr. Fiske is purely speculative and therefore must 
be rejected. 
D. The Policy Board's Decision To Place Plaintiff On Hold 
Was Not Based Upon Her Sex. 
Faced with overwhelmingly negative commentary which 
was both widespread and intense, the Admissions Committee truly 
had only two options available with respect to plaintiff's 1983 
candidacy: to tell her that she would never be admitted to the 
firm or to place her candidacy on hold. The Admissions 
Committee after several votes recommended the less drastic 
option, and the Policy Board adopted this recommendation. Yet 
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plaintiff claims that she would have been admitted had she been 
a man. (Plaintiff's Finding 73) There is simply no basis for 
this claim. 
1. The Admissions Committee Regularly Cites 
Interpersonal Skills In Its "Hold" And "No" 
Decisions. 
Price Waterhouse has introduced into evidence the 
Admissions Committee materials concerning 31 male candidates 
concerning whom the Admissions Committee recommended a "hold" 
or a "no" decision, citing problems in interpersonal skills. 
(Defendant's Exh. 64) In addition, testimony by Donald Ziegler 
and Roger Marcellin identified particular candidates whose 
difficulties paralleled those of plaintiff. (R. 268 & 314) 
Plaintiff attempts to discredit this evidence by placing all of 
these male candidates into two categories: "the incompetent" 
and "the young." (Plaintiff's Findings 48-49) 
Plaintiff takes great liberties with the factual 
record in describing other candidates for admission as 
incompetent or lackluster and in distinguishing herself from 
these candidates because of her position "at or near the top" 
of all candidates under consideration. (Plaintiff's 
Finding 19) The only comparative records in evidence in fact 
show otherwise - plaintiff was at the bottom of the MAS 
candidates that year in scoring, and the number of "no" 
recommendations that she received from partners was equaled or 
exceeded only by two candidates, each of whom were told that 
18 
.. 
they would never be admitted to the firm. (Defendant's 
Exhs. 36 & 69) She apparently bases her claim on her proposal, 
(Plaintiff's Finding 19), which by design addressed only those 
qualities that caused the partners in OGS to propose her, and 
upon the Admissions Committee memorandum, which borrowed 
heavily from the proposal in order to justify recommending a 
"hold" rather than a "no." (R. 207, 312-13 & 381) 
As to the other comparable candidates, plaintiff 
distinguishes them as "the young," who were placed.on hold to 
give them another year to mature. (Plaintiff's Finding 49) 
Such situations are quite analogous to that of plaintiff, but 
plaintiff without elaboration claims that young males are not 
similarly situated. This is especially puzzling in light of 
the fact that plaintiff had worked for Price Waterhouse a 
relatively short time before her proposal and was therefore 
"young" in terms of experience with Price Waterhouse when the 
Admissions Committee reviewed her qualifications for admission. 
2. Plaintiff Was Not Similarly Situated With The Two 
Candidates She Claims Were Admitted Despite 
Concerns About Interpersonal Skills. 
Of the over two hundred male candidates for 
admission from 1982 through 1984, plaintiff has identified only 
two candidates who she claims were admitted despite expressed 
concerns about their interpersonal skills. (Plaintiff's 
Finding 46) Although plaintiff argues that the Admissions 
Committee practice of preparing explanatory memoranda only with 
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respect to "hold" or "no" decisions hindered her search, 
(Plaintiff's Finding 47), interpersonal skills concerns are 
expressed in the first instance in the long and short forms, 
which were available to plaintiff and summarized in one of 
defendant's exhibits. (Defendant's Exh. 68) The record shows 
that the two candidates that she identified were not similarly 
situated to plaintiff with respect to either interpers9nal 
skills difficulties or technical abilities. 
Neither of these candidates received . the 
widespread, intense and overwhelmingly negative long- and 
short-form response received by plaintiff concerning 
interpersonal skills. Nevertherless, even much smaller numbers 
of negative comments caused the Admissions Committee and the 
Policy Board some concern, which further corroborates their 
close examination of candidates in this area. In each of these 
cases, the balancing of the firm's immediate need for the 
candidate's special and unique technical skills against some 
clearly limited concerns about interpersonal skills resulted in 
his admission. Thus, plaintiff and these candidates were not 
similarly situated. (R. 276-77; Deposition of Joseph Connor 
("Connor Dep.") at 34, 82-83 & 95-96; Defendant's Exhs. 73, 83 
& 84) 
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E. Plaintiff's Statistical Studies Provide No Basis Fo r A 
Finding Of Sex Discrimination On The Part Of The 
Policy Board. 
Plaintiff attempts to use statistical evidence to 
prove that the reasons offered by the decisionmakers in this 
case are pretextual. Plaintiff's stat i stical exhibits purport 
to examine (1) the average time for males and females to 
advance to Manager; (2) the rates at which male and female 
Senior Managers were proposed for admission; and (3) the 
numbers of males and females admitted to the firm. These 
statistics, however, do not address the treatment of females by 
the decisionmaking partners herein. More particularly, 
plaintiff's statistics do not focus upon those partners ' 
historical treatment of female and male Senior Managers in 
considering whether to propose them for partnership and in 
commenting upon or disposing of their candidacies . fl_/ Because 
of this lack of focus , plaintiff's statistical exhibits are of 
no probative value in determining the intent or motive of the 
decisionmakers in this case . See Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 
750 (2d Cir. 1984); Smithers v . Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 899 (3d 
Cir. 1980). Cf. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S . 
567, 580 (1978); Davis v . Litton Bionetics, Inc., 444 F. Supp . 
638, 646 (D . Md . 1978). 
~/ One study does not even focus on the kinds of decisions at 
issue, much less the operative decisionmakers. (Plaintiff's 
Exh. 38(c)) Another is without focus upon the relevant time 
period herein . (Plaintiff's Exh . 38(a)) See Lehman v. Trout, 
104 S. Ct . 1404 (1984). 
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The absence of an appropriate focus is not the 
only reason to reject the plaintiff's statistical evidence. 
The studies fail to take into account the most obvious and 
legitimate characteristics or qualifications which affect the 
time it takes to advance to Manager, the likelihood of being 
proposed for partnership in a given year and the likelihood of 
being admitted to the firm. These defects are substantial and 
they bias the results of plaintiff's studies. 
1 . Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(a) Is Not Probative 
Concerning Partnership Admission Decisions. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(a) appears to be a study 
of the treatment of females by the firm in its decisions 
concerning admission to partnership. The study effectively 
compares female representation in the 1984 snapshot of the 
partnership (7 of 662) and an unspecified female availability 
throughout the over 25-year period when the decisions were made 
to admit these partners. Plaintiff appears to contend that the 
female percentage of those "available'' during this 25-year 
period was substantially higher than their representation in 
the 1984 partnership snapshot. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(a) fails to focus upon the 
proper pool of those available to be admitted. This is the 
group of those Senior Managers who have been proposed by their 
local offices for admission to the firm. Attaining Senior 
Manager status and being proposed by one's local office are the 
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minimum basic qualifications to be eligible for a firm decision 
as to admission for partnership. See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 
1249, 1274-77, 238 U.S. App. D.C. 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984); EEOC v. 
Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 660 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd 
on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2794 (1984). Since plaintiff has 
failed to account for these qualifications, the exhibit should 
not be considered probative as to the firm's treatment of 
females available for admission. 
The fact is that the only liability period study 
of the firm's partnership decisions, much less the only study 
using the proper availability pool, is Defendant's Exhibit 77. 
Exhibit 77 demonstrates that females were treated no 
differently than males in partnership decisions from 1979 
through 1984. Plaintiff's expert admitted to having reviewed 
well before trial the statistics set forth in Defendant's 
Exhibit 77 and being instructed by counsel not to take account 
of them in his conclusions. (R. 520-21) Instead he invented 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(a) to achieve results purporting to 
support plaintiff's allegations. At trial, he tried to dismiss 
Defendant's Exhibit 77 as involving numbers of available 
females too small to support any statistical conclusion, 
(R. 521-24), this despite his use of numbers in the same 
magnitude or size to support his conclusions in Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 38(b). (If the statistics in Defendant's Exhibit 77 
are indeed too small to draw a conclusion, then by definition 
they are too small to support an inference of discrimination in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(b).) 
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2. Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(b) Is Based Upon Erroneous 
Assumptions. 
Plaintiff offered Exhibit 38(b) as a study of 
whether females suffered discrimination in the decisions to 
propose Senior Managers for partnership. The exhibit and the 
conclusions plaintiff seeks to have drawn are based upon 
several erroneous assumptions. 
First, Exhibit 38(b) assumes that because 
administrative Managers can be proposed for partners, they are 
as likely to be proposed in any given year as professional 
Managers. The evidence directly contradicts this assumption of 
equal qualifications or an equal likelihood of being proposed 
for administrative and professional Managers . (Not a single 
administrative Manager was proposed from 1981-1985.) The 
evidence also demonstrates that when the male and female 
administrative Managers are excluded from plaintiff's analysis, 
the differences between male and female professional Managers' 
proposal rates under plaintiff's own method of study are not 
statistically significant. (R. 637) 
Another significant error in Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 38(b) is that in calculating the expected number of 
female proposals in each given year, less experienced Managers 
are considered equally likely to be proposed as the more 
experienced Managers. The evidence demonstrates this 
assumption to be in error and that the assumption causes female 
availability to be overstated. The overstatement occurs 
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because the female representation in the Manager ranks is 
growing in real numbers and percentage terms each year. (R. 
637-40) The result is that proportionately more of the female 
Managers in any given year are in the less-experienced range. 
For example, in the 1982 proposals 58 percent of the females 
were new entrants to plaintiff's five-year availability 
grouping whereas 49 percent of the males were new. In 1983 the 
percentages were 65 percent female and 46 percent male. 
Interestingly, plaintiff's expert has in other 
cases regularly taken into account differences in the length of 
experience or tenure in trying to predict the treatment of 
males and females. For example, in Bazemore v. Friday, 751 
F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1984), he sought to predict salaries with a 
regression using length of job tenure as an explanatory 
variable. Common sense and the empirical data in this case 
tells us that differences in the length of experience are also 
predictive of the likelihood of being proposed. Plaintiff's 
expert chose to ignore them and thus to inflate female 
"availability." 
Defendant's Exhibit 87 illustrates the effect of 
plaintiff's erroneous assumption. In this exhibit proposal 
rates are calculated for males from each contract year "class" 
(i.e., each level of experience) for each year. An expected 
number of female proposals from the same class is then 
determined by using the actual male proposal rate for that 
class and multiplying it times the number of females in that 
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same class. The results reflect a "shortfall" of about 3 
females in 1983 and about 2 females in 1984. 
Perhaps an even more serious problem with 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(b) is that it assumes a ll proposals are 
made by the same decisionmakers picking from a single pool of 
all Senior Managers. This is not the case and pl a intiff 
obviously knows it. Even taking the disparities between the 
expected female and the actual female proposal rates in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(b), plaintiff's expert could shed no 
light on which local office partners had engaged in the 
supposed discrimination. He certainly did not cite OGS and 
could not have. There is no allegation that any other female 
in OGS has not been proposed or forecast for proposal when she 
should have. Had this happened, plaintiff certainly would have 
been aware and would have raised it. 
3 . Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(c) Is Based on Erroneous 
Assumptions. 
Plaintiff offered Exhibit 38(c) as evidence that 
it took females hired in some years significantly longer to 
advance to Manager than males hired in those same years. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(c) assumes that the females hired below 
the Manager level entered the firm on average at the same level 
as males hired below the Manager level and thus that the 
females should have progressed to Manager in the same average 
time as the males. This assumption was directly contradicted 
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by the evidence concerning hiring patterns which show males on 
average entered the firm at a higher level below the Manager 
rank. (Defendant's Exhs. 70, 85 & 86) Plaintiff's erroneous 
assumption biased the results of her study and fails to comport 
with known factual realities. (R. 631-35; see Pegues v. 
Mississippi St. Emp. Service, 699 F.2d 760, 770 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 482 (1983) (Dr. Mann's study rejected 
for failure to account for experience differences)) 
Even ignoring the serious failure to . account for 
legitimate differences in the average experience and 
qualifications of the male and female groups, plaintiff's study 
results are of no relevance to the conduct at issue herein nor 
to the assessment of the motive of the decisionmakers herein. 
That is, Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(c) addresses the discrete 
decisions by each group of local office partners to advance 
persons to the Manager status by lumping all the decisions 
together as if made by the same decisionmakers from single 
firmwide pool. Even ignoring the failure of Exhibit 38(c) to 
account for basic qualifications, the disparities reported 
therein cannot be attributed to any particular group of local 
office partners and particularly the 0GS partners. They also 
do not speak to the treatment of female Senior Managers. 
4. Plaintiff's Statistical Studies Have No Probative 
Value . 
Briefly, plaintiff's statistical exhibits and 
their results or conclusions are founded on erroneous 
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assumptions. The exhibits do not employ models which fit 
factual realities. The exhibits fail to address the actions or 
practices of the decisionmakers involved in this case. While 
the Supreme Court has held that statistical evidence can be of 
some limited probative value as to the motive issue in an 
individual disparate treatment case, the statistics here are so 
flawed and unfocused as to have no probative value. Cf. Furnco 
Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580. 
To the extent that statistics have been offered 
that are relevant to the overall trends and policies in the 
firm concerning the treatment of female professionals, they are 
found in Defendant's Exhibits 70, 85 and 86.fl/ These 
statistics reflect a steady, persistent and substantial 
increase in the female population and representation 
percentages at all levels of the firm's workforce. In Pouncy 
3/ In late January 1985, plaintiff made a discovery request of 
Price Waterhouse for certain limited statistical information . 
Price Waterhouse timely supplied plaintiff in February with a 
computer tape containing all of the information plaintiff that 
requested. Subsequently, at the pre-trial conference plaintiff 
disclosed for the first time her statistical contentions and 
exhibits. With this last-minute introduction of unfocused and 
flawed studies, plaintiff now suggests that the defendant has 
the burden of proof on statistical matters and should have in 
the week before trial generated studies precisely demonstrating 
the effect of failing to take into account the kinds of factors 
which plaintiff's expert admits he would like to have 
considered (but plaintiff never requested). (Plaintiff's 
Finding 40) This approach to statistical proofs suggests that 
plaintiff believes that defendant has the burden of proof in 
this case. 
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v. Prudential I n surance Co., 668 F.2d 795, 804 (5th Cir. 1982), 
the court affirmed a finding that stati stics reflecting a 
"gradual but steady increase in the percentages of black 
employees in all levels" of the workforce were "inconsistent 
with any policy of discrimination." See EEOC v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 31 FEP Cases 531 (D. Conn. 1983); Lewis v. Bloomsburg 
Mills, Inc . , 30 FEP Cases 1715, 1729 (D.S.C. 1982~ 
F. Plaintiff's Reference To Counseling Concerning 
Grooming And Appearance Is A Red Herring. 
Plaintiff attempts to infuse her case with some hint 
of sex discrimination by emphasizing counseling she purportedly 
received concerning her grooming and personal appearance. 
(Plaintiff's Finding 53(c)) This counseling is a red herring 
for a number of reasons. First, these suggestions came from 
her supporters, and there is no evidence of such concerns on 
the part of her detractors. Second, there is absolutely no 
indication that the Policy Board based its decision on such 
considerations. Third, male employees are counseled on such 
matters as well, (Connor Dep. at 21-22), and therefore such 
counseling cannot be challenged as sex discrimination. See 
Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983). 




II. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That The Reasons Articulated 
By Price Waterhouse For the OGS Decision Were 
Pretextual. 
The decision of the OGS partners not to propose 
plaintiff for admission to the firm the next year was based 
upon concerns about plaintiff's interpersonal skills and 
management skills. Two partners expressed strong opposition 
and the OGS partners, who were well aware of the reasons 
underlying the Policy Board's hold decision, voted 13 to 2 
against proposing her that year. During the deliberations, 
which took place over several hours, none of the other 11 
partners who opposed her proposal, and neither of those in 
favor of the proposal, suggested that these concerns had no 
basis. Instead, the remarks by other partners confirmed rather 
than challenged these two partners' concerns. 
Thus, Price Waterhouse has articulated a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the OGS decision through the 
introduction of the testimony of Thomas Beyer and Donald 
Epelbaum, Beyer's handwritten notes of the OGS deliberations, 
and Beyer's letter informing Joseph Connor of the decision . 
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating 
that the articulated reasons are pretextual, and accordingly 
has failed to satisfy her ultimate burden of persuading the 
court that she was the victim of intentional discrimination on 
the basis of sex. Price Waterhouse therefore is entitled to 
judgment in its favor concerning this decision. 
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A. The Actions Of Partners Outside OGS Are Not Relevant 
To This Inquiry. 
Plaintiff has injected yet more irrelevant matte :: s 
into her challenge of the OGS decision, by introducing the 
actions of partners outside OGS as purported evidence of 
pretext on the part of the OGS partners. First, she notes that 
other 1983 candidates who were placed on hold were reproposed 
by their h cal offices for admission in 1984. (Plaintiff's 
Finding 64) The decisionmakers in these offices were not those 
who decided not to propose plaintiff and therefore no proper 
comparisons can be drawn. 
Second, she points to representations by Paul Goodstat 
and Joseph Connor about involving plaintiff in new projects. 
(Plaintiff's Finding 65) Even if the failure to follow through 
with these intentions was based upon plaintiff's sex, their 
actions were wholly unrelated to the OGS decision, and 
therefore are not probative as to the issue of pretext on the 
part of the OGS partners. 
B. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That The Reasons 
Underlying The OGS Decision Were Pretextual. 
The only issue concerning the OGS decision not to 
propose plaintiff the next year is whether the articulated 
reasons are pretextual. Plaintiff however has not introduced 
any evidence that the OGS partners' response to certain 
expressed concerns was pretextual, and has focused her attack 
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instead on the alleged pretextual nature of the serious 
concerns expressed by two OGS partners, Benton Warder and 
Donald Epelbaum. (Plaintiff's Findings 67-70) 
Plaintiff would indeed be hard-pressed to find 
evidence of sex discrimination by the OGS partners as a group. 
Females represent a higher percentage of the Managers and 
Senior Managers in OGS than in the firm overall. Further, the 
OGS partners proposed plaintiff for admission only a year 
earlier (after including her in the forecast for admission as 
early as 1980), and forecast the admission of five female OGS 
Senior Managers from 1985 through 1987. (Defendant's Exhs. 8, 
12, 20, 65, 66, 67 & 70) Finally, the testimony of Sandra 
Kinsey, a nine-year employee of OGS, attests to the equal 
opportunities for females at OGS. (R. 435-36) 
C. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That Warder's Concerns 
Were Pretextual. 
Benton Warder opposed plaintiff's proposal for 
admission in 1984 because of continued concerns about her 
interpersonal skills and new concerns about her management of 
the REMS project. Plaintiff cites three bases upon which she 
claims that his concerns were based on her sex: (1) his "hold" 
recommendation as to her 1983 candidacy; (2) his review of the 
REMS project; and (3) allegedly sex-based comments, 
(Plaintiff's Finding 68), but falls far short of establishing 
that Warder's concerns were pretextual. 
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Plaintiff testified at trial and at her deposition 
that her relations with Warder on the FMS project were not 
good, admitting that she had been difficult to work with and 
had behaved like a "bitch. 11 (R. 107-08; Hopkins Dep. at 74) 
Warder was eventually removed as project partner, and plaintiff 
believes that he attributes his removal, and the resulting 
financial and professional losses, to her. (Hopkins Dep. at 
74-75) In light of their prior dealings, it is hardly 
surprising that Warder would recommend during the 1983 
admissions cycle that she be "held," at the same time 
recognizing her "major contribution to the firm." (Defendant's 
Exh. 27) 
The REMS review, which plaintiff described in her 
testimony merely as "hostile," is now termed "evidently 
pretextual, 11 although there is no evidence upon which to base 
this conclusion. Indeed, plaintiff admitted that the project 
had been found technically deficient in a subsequent quality 
control review. (R. 114) Furthermore, Warder had absolutely 
no incentive to pretextually criticize a project for which the 
Partner in Charge of the office served as project partner, 
especially in light of Warder's previous removal from the FMS 
project. 
Even if Warder's long-form comments and review of the 
REMS project were motivated by some personal grudge against 
plaintiff, she has failed to link them in any way to her sex. 
The so-called "sex-based" comments made by Warder in other 
contexts do not suffice to provide such a link. Plaintiff 
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testified that Warder criticized her for talking like a 
truckdriver, (R. 120), but produced no evidence that he accepts 
such language in male professionals at Price Waterhouse. 
Finally, Warder's statement to Nold after plaintiff left the 
firm that two children might be "a little too much" for a 
working woman, (R. 421), simply does not demonstrate that 
plaintiff's sex played any part in his opposition to her 
candidacy. 
D. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That Epelbaum's 
Concerns Were Pretextual. 
Following his transfer to 0GS in 1982, Donald Epelbaum 
initially supported plaintiff's admission to the firm. 
(Defendant's Exh. 27) He immediately recognized her strengths, 
counseled her concerning her weaknesses, especially in the area 
of interpersonal skills, and candidly discussed both in his 
long-form comments. (R. 376-80) By the time of Roger 
Marcellin's visit to 0GS, Epelbaum's support had begun to 
erode, based upon his uncontroverted discussions with staff 
members in both 0GS and the St. Louis office who did not want 
to work with plaintiff again and upon his own dealings with 
plaintiff. (R. 386-87) This support had turned to opposition 
by the time the 0GS partners met to consider whether to propose 
plaintiff the next year, based on his further dealings with 
her. (R. 387-89) 
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of 
establishing that Epelbaum's concerns were pretextual. Indeed, 
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his progression from support to opposition suggests just the 
opposite -- a sexist would more likely oppose a woman 
throughout. Epelbaum also had an obvious incentive not to 
oppose plaintiff's candidacy in the face of strong support by 
Beyer, the Partner in Charge of OGS. (R. 217) 
Plaintiff did not controvert any of Epelbaum's 
testimony concerning his discussions with staff members. 
Instead, plaintiff flatly denied Epelbaum's version of their 
dealings, but yet did not provide her own version. (R . 704-05; 
707-08 & 708-09). This is especially surprising in light of 
her alleged ability to recall, word-for-word, discussions with 
Connor, Beyer, Krulwich, Coffey, Warder, and MacVeagh. (See, 
~, R. 38, 81, 87-88, 89-96, 99, 101, 105 & 106-10) In 
addition, her inconsistent testimony concerning her relations 
with others, discussed supra, raises serious questions as to 
her credibility. Epelbaum is clearly the more credible witness 
on these matters, and thus plaintiff has failed to carry her 
burden of proving pretext on the part of Epelbaum. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff has failed 
to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that she was the victim 
of intentional sex discrimination. The requisite proof 
required to satisfy this burden cannot be based on wholly 
unfounded suspicion, nor can all inferences be drawn in 
plaintiff's favor merely because she is female where there is 
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credible proof counteracting the inferences urged by 
plaintiff. Butler v. Young, No. 83-0715, slip op. at 9 
(D.D.C., Dec. 27, 1984). The Court therefore should enter 
judgment in favor of Price Waterhouse in this action. 
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